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Shuffling to Justice
WHY CHILDREN SHOULD NOT
BE SHACKLED IN COURT
I.

INTRODUCTION

Her hands were secured tightly with metal handcuffs,
and foot cuffs were clasped around her ankles.1 A leather belt
was wrapped around her waist. This belt held metal rings that
were linked to the handcuffs by a chain.2 This “restraint belt”
prevented her from raising her hands above waist level.3 As her
ankles were held closely together by the footcuffs, she had to
shuffle in order to walk.4 Led by Office of Children’s and Family
Services (“OCFS”) staff, she was made to shuffle through a
waiting room filled with people, with the clanking of her metal
chains heard by all.5 She is Jenny P., a fifteen-year-old girl
who was adjudicated a delinquent in Kings County Family
Court in Brooklyn.6 She was required to live and receive
rehabilitative services at the Auburn Residential Center, a
non-secure facility operated by OCFS.7 At Auburn, Jenny P.
participated in field trips, she was on the Honor Roll, and she
completed anger management and drug prevention programs.8
She had never exhibited violent behavior during her trips to

1
This anecdote is taken from First Amended Complaint at 15, Jenny P. v.
Johnson, No. 37784/2005 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Complaint, Jenny
P.], available at http://www.njdc.info/2006resourceguide/start.swf (follow “Advocacy in
Juvenile Court” hyperlink; then follow “First Amended Complaint in Jenny P. v.
Johnson” hyperlink under “B. Shackling”); Memorandum of Law in Support of
Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief and Temporary Restraining Order
at 13-16, No. 37784/2005 [hereinafter TRO Motion, Jenny P.], available at
http://www.njdc.info/2006resourceguide/start.swf (follow “Advocacy in Juvenile Court”
hyperlink; then follow “Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion” hyperlink under “B.
Shackling”).
2
Complaint, Jenny P., supra note 1, at 5-6.
3
Id. at 6.
4
See id. at 15.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 7; TRO Motion, Jenny P., supra note 1, at 11.
7
TRO Motion, Jenny P., supra note 1, at 11.
8
Id. at 11-12.
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court.9 Furthermore, the court did not determine that the
restraints were necessary to prevent her from attempting to
hurt someone or escaping the courtroom.10 In fact, no one had
ever inquired as to Jenny P.’s mood or feelings each time she
was brought to court and made to wait in a secure holding
room while in shackles, or when she was brought in front of the
judge wearing full restraints.11
Jenny P.’s experience is not uncommon. In fact, until
2005 when the Legal Aid Society brought a class action lawsuit
challenging the blanket OCFS policy of shackling children,
each child who was in OCFS custody was shackled for the
duration of the time they were in court.12 One child was made
to wait for nearly eight hours while fully shackled in a waiting
room.13 Moreover, they were required to appear in front of the
judge in footcuffs and a restraint belt, without any individualized determination of need.14 The practice of shackling
children who are in the juvenile justice system is not isolated to
New York. Indeed, at least twenty-eight states have courts that
require juveniles to appear in shackles during juvenile court
proceedings.15 Active litigation is challenging this practice in
New York and Florida.16 However, in some courtrooms around
the country, defenders’ motions for children to appear at
proceedings free from restraints are routinely denied in the
name of courtroom security.17 Judges in Florida recently denied
such motions, explaining that they were not convinced by
evidence showing that shackling may cause psychological
damage and noting the importance of maintaining courtroom
security.18 Thus, although some counties have been successful
9

Id. at 17.
Id. at 1.
11
Id. at 12-16.
12
Id. at 1.
13
Id. at 9.
14
Id. at 1, 5.
15
Martha T. Moore, Should Kids Go to Court in Chains?, USA TODAY.COM,
June 18, 2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-06-17shackles_N.htm.
16
John F. v. Carrion, No. 07/407117 (NY. Sup. Ct. Dec. 12 2007) (on file with
author) (The Jenny P. action was withdrawn and re-filed with the new named plaintiff
John F.); infra notes 129-132 and accompanying text.
17
See infra Part IV.A-B (discussing the extent of shackling practice and
response of courts in select counties).
18
Kathleen Chapman, Judges Refuse to Unshackle Juveniles, PALM BEACH
POST, Feb. 2, 2007, available at http://www.pdmiami.com/Palm_Beach_Post-Judges_
refuse_to_unshackle_juveniles.pdf. In denying motions submitted by the Palm Beach
County Office of the Public Defender to allow juveniles to appear in court free from
10
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in challenging the routine use of shackles on juveniles, many
children continue to be shackled each time they appear in
juvenile court. The juvenile justice system has its historical
roots in providing treatment instead of punishment.19 Shackling thwarts the very purpose of this system by treating
children like criminals.
The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that blanket
policies that require all criminal defendants to appear in court
while shackled are impermissible.20 However, the Court is
silent on the applicability of this rule to juvenile court
proceedings. Because there is no clear jurisprudence on when
shackles may be used during juvenile court proceedings, state
policies vary widely.21 While a handful of courts have held that
juveniles may not be shackled without some showing of need,
many others have failed to apply any standard.22 Therefore,
thousands of children are required to endure the humiliation
and physical pain of shackling even though they show no
threat of danger or risk of flight.
In this Note, I argue that routine and indiscriminate
use of shackles on juveniles is contrary to the objectives of
the juvenile justice system. The juvenile justice system was
premised on the notion that juveniles need treatment and
rehabilitation, and they should not be treated punitively like
adults.23 Further, I argue that when children are required to
appear in court in shackles for no justification, their sense of

restraints, the panel of four judges concluded that “the public defender did not present
satisfying evidence that the restraints can cause psychological damage and failed to
consider court security.”
19
See infra Part III (discussing the purpose of the juvenile justice system).
20
Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 628-29 (2005).
21
See infra Part IV.A.
22
There have been numerous successful challenges to the routine and
indiscriminate use of shackles on juveniles in state courts. See Tiffany A. v. Superior
Court of L.A. County, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363, 373 (Ct. App. 2007) (stating that courts may
not apply a blanket shackling policy without individualized determination of need);
In re Staley, 352 N.E.2d 3, 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (finding error where a child was
shackled without sufficient reason, such as to prevent escape or to ensure courtroom
safety), aff’d, 364 N.E.2d 72 (Ill. 1977); State v. Merrell, 12 P.3d 556, 558 (Or. Ct. App.
2000) (stating in a case involving a juvenile that a defendant may only be shackled
when the court has determined that he poses a “serious risk of committing dangerous
or disruptive behavior, or . . . a serious risk of escape”); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of
Multnomah County v. Millican, 906 P.2d 857, 860-61 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that
shackling a juvenile during a bench trial constituted constitutional error but that such
error was harmless because there was no showing that the restraint was prejudicial).
But see infra Part IV.A for examples of courts that have not applied the general rule
from Deck to the shackling of juveniles.
23
See infra Part III.A.
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fairness and justice is disrupted. The judicial system has an
opportunity to educate children about justice and equality, but
the routine use of shackles reinforces the notion that our
justice system is unfair and inequitable. Further, it teaches
children that they are not valued and respected.
In Part II, I describe the legal standard for shackling in
criminal court, including the Supreme Court decision Deck v.
Missouri and the evolution of federal law applicable to
shackling adult criminal defendants in court. Then, in Part III,
I discuss the objectives of the juvenile court system, focusing on
the system’s origins in treatment and rehabilitation rather
than punishment. Part III concludes that a bargain was struck
between the juvenile courts and children in the system to
provide fewer procedural protections in exchange for a more
rehabilitative and less punitive system. This bargain, I will
argue, is repudiated through the practice of shackling children
in court.
In Part IV, I examine the extent to which courts require
children to appear in shackles, the harms shackling causes to
children, and the misguided justifications that are offered for
requiring children to appear shackled in court. Finally, in
Part V, I begin with an overview of the scant case law
regarding shackling children in juvenile court. Then, I argue
that the recent California Court of Appeal case Tiffany A. v.
Superior Court sets forth a model analysis against routine
shackling that recasts the demand to end indiscriminate
shackling in terms of the distinct characteristics and needs of
juveniles in the juvenile system. Instead of relying solely on the
framework provided in Deck, juvenile courts should emphasize
that shackling is distinctly harmful when applied to children
because of the rehabilitative focus of the juvenile courts. I
conclude by offering another reason to end the practice of
routinely shackling children in court: when shackling juvenile
defendants is limited to those rare situations when there is an
individualized need, young people learn the values of a fair and
just criminal justice system.
II.

SHACKLING AND THE LEGAL STANDARD IN CRIMINAL
COURT

The first court to speak on the issue of using shackles on
a criminal defendant was the California Supreme Court in
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1871.24 In People v. Harrington, the defendants had been
convicted of robbery, and throughout their trial they had
appeared in “irons.”25 The California Supreme Court denied the
defendants’ request that they be tried without the shackles.26
On appeal, the defendants argued that their common law
rights were violated when they were tried while shackled.27 The
California Supreme Court held that requiring the defendants
to be tried in shackles without justification violated their
rights.28 Furthermore, the court expressed some of the key
concerns that the United States Supreme Court later relied
upon when it ruled against the indiscriminate use of visible
shackles on a defendant at trial and sentencing.29 These
concerns were that shackles have a prejudicial effect and
disrupt a defendant’s ability to adequately participate in his
defense.30 While the Harrington court set down a clear rule on
the use of shackles, most other courts remained silent on the
issue until the twentieth century.31
Today, the right of the accused to appear at trial free
from the visible restraint of shackles has been upheld by
numerous courts as a matter of state or federal law.32 The

24

People v. Harrington, 42 Cal. 165 (1871).
Id. at 166.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 168-69 (ruling on common law grounds, but noting that state
constitutional rights might be implicated).
29
Compare id. at 168 with Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 630-31 (2005);
Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568 (1986); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970).
30
The Harrington Court stated:
25

[A]ny order or action of the Court which, without evident necessity, imposes
physical burdens, pains and restraints upon a prisoner during the progress of
his trial, inevitably tends to confuse and embarrass his mental faculties, and
thereby materially to abridge and prejudicially affect his constitutional rights
of defense; and especially would such physical bonds and restraints in like
manner materially impair and prejudicially affect his statutory privilege of
becoming a competent witness and testifying in his own behalf.
42 Cal. at 168.
31
Deck, 544 U.S. at 641-42 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“In 35 States, no
recorded state-court decision on the issue appears until the 20th century. Of those 35
States, 21 States have no recorded decision on the question until the 1950’s or later.
The 14 state (including then-territorial) courts that addressed the matter before the
20th century only began to do so in the 1870’s.”).
32
See generally Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Propriety and Prejudicial
Effect of Gagging, Shackling, or Otherwise Physically Restraining Accused During
Course of State Criminal Trial, 90 A.L.R. 3D 17 (1979) (discussing several state cases
recognizing as a general rule an accused’s right to appear at trial free of shackles). For
a list of lower court decisions upholding the right of defendants to appear free from
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primary concern expressed regarding shackling at the guilt
phase of a criminal trial is potential for prejudicing the jury.33
Courts also note the impact shackling has on the accused’s
ability to participate in his own defense and to communicate
with his attorney, as well as the effect shackles have on the
dignity and decorum of the courtroom.34 The Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on shackling has evolved through three main
cases: Illinois v. Allen, Holbrook v. Flynn, and Deck v.
Missouri.35
A.

Illinois v. Allen (1970)

In Illinois v. Allen, the Supreme Court held that the use
of shackles, binds, or gags on a defendant who is unwilling to
behave appropriately at trial may be necessary, but that these
techniques may only be used as a last resort.36 In Allen, the
defendant was convicted of armed robbery when he stole $200
at gunpoint from a bartender.37 At trial, Allen demanded that
he act as his own attorney, and the trial judge allowed him to
represent himself until he began to act in a hostile and defiant
manner.38 During voir dire Allen repeatedly ignored the judge’s
warnings that he must behave while in court. After Allen
refused to cooperate, made statements threatening the judge’s
life, and insisted that “there would be no trial,” the trial judge
removed Allen for part of the proceedings.39 Allen was allowed
to return to the proceedings after he agreed to behave properly,

visible restraint, but allowing the right to be overcome by essential state interests such
as courtroom security or escape prevention, see Deck, 544 U.S. at 628-29.
33
Deck, 544 U.S. at 630 (detailing the prejudicial effect of visible shackles).
“Visible shackling undermines the presumption of innocence and the related fairness of
the factfinding process.” Id.
34
See Shapiro, supra note 32, at 17.
35
See generally Deck, 544 U.S. 622 (holding that the prohibition on visible
restraints without a showing of an essential state interest applies with equal force to
the penalty phase of a capital trial as it does to the guilt phase); Holbrook v. Flynn, 475
U.S. 560 (1986) (holding that the presence of security guards was not so prejudicial as
to deny the defendant’s right to a fair trial); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970)
(finding that shackles should only be used as a last resort).
36
Allen, 397 U.S. at 343-44.
37
Id. at 338-39.
38
Id. at 339-41.
39
Id. at 340. During one of Allen’s outbursts, he stated, “When I go out for
lunchtime, you’re [the judge] going to be a corpse here.” Id. (quoting United States ex
rel. Allen v. Illinois, 413 F.2d 232, 233 (7th Cir.1969), rev’d on other grounds, Illinois v.
Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970)).
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but he made another outburst and was again removed from the
courtroom.40
In reviewing the case, the Supreme Court attempted to
strike a balance between upholding a defendant’s constitutional rights and maintaining safety and the appropriate
administration of criminal proceedings. The Court set forth
three constitutionally permissible ways for a trial judge to
handle a defiant defendant: “(1) bind and gag him, thereby
keeping him present; (2) cite him for contempt; [and] (3) take
him out of the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself
properly.”41 While the Court acknowledged that circumstances
may exist that permit the use of shackles or physical restraints
on a defendant, it took pains to emphasize that the use of
shackles should be severely limited, declaring that shackles
and gags should only be used as a “last resort.”42 The Court
further noted that the “sight of shackles and gags”43 might
impact the jury’s feelings about the defendant, may impair the
defendant’s ability to communicate with his attorney, and is
generally an “affront to the very dignity and decorum of
judicial proceedings that the judge is seeking to uphold.”44
Thus, Allen stands for the proposition that requiring a
defendant to appear in court in visible physical restraints is an
offense to a fair and impartial criminal justice system, and
must only be used as an absolute last resort.
B.

Holbrook v. Flynn (1986)

Sixteen years later, the United States Supreme Court
considered the presence of uniformed guards at a defendant’s
trial in comparison to visible shackles. In Holbrook v. Flynn,
40

Id. at 340-41. Shortly after the trial judge warned Allen that if he
continued to make outbursts he would be removed from the courtroom, Allen
announced, “There is going to be no proceeding. I’m going to start talking and I’m going
to keep on talking all through the trial. There’s not going to be no trial like this. I want
my sister and friends here in court to testify for me.” Allen, 413 F.2d, at 234.
41
Id. at 343-44.
42
Id. at 344. The Court stated, “But even to contemplate such a technique [to
bind and gag], much less see it, arouses a feeling that no person should be tried while
shackled and gagged except as a last resort.” Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.; see also Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 505-06 (1976) (finding that
requiring a criminal defendant to wear prison clothing during his trial violated his
Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the law). The Court noted that
“no essential state policy” is furthered by this requirement. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 505.
The Court nonetheless upheld the conviction because the defendant failed to make an
objection to the trial court. Id. at 512-13.
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the Supreme Court held that the defendant’s constitutional
right to a fair trial was not violated when, during the trial, four
uniformed state troopers in addition to the regular courtroom
security officers sat in the front row of the courtroom.45 The
Court distinguished this case from Estelle v. Williams46 and
Allen, concluding that physical restraints and prison clothing
are significantly different from the sight of uniformed police
officers at a trial.47 The Court maintained that “shackling and
prison clothes are unmistakable indications of the need to
separate a defendant from the community at large.”48 In
contrast, the Court stated that “the presence of guards at a
defendant’s trial need not be interpreted as a sign that he is
particularly dangerous or culpable.”49 Furthermore, the Court
compared the sight of uniformed security within a courtroom to
visible shackles and concluded that uniformed security was not
so “inherently prejudicial” to the defendant that it must comply
with the legal standard for shackling and therefore be “justified
by an essential state interest specific to each trial.”50 Thus, the
Court suggested a hierarchy where shackling stood above other
potential marks of criminality as particularly suggestive and
insidious.
C.

Deck v. Missouri (2005)

Most recently, the Supreme Court rejected the use of
visible shackles on an adult defendant during the sentencing
phase of a criminal trial. In 1998, Carmen Deck was convicted
of the robbery and murder of an elderly couple in their home.51
Throughout Deck’s sentencing proceedings, he was shackled
with leg irons, handcuffs, and a belly chain.52 Deck’s attorney
objected to the use of shackles several times during the

45

Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 571-72 (1986).
425 U.S. 501 (1976).
47
Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 569.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 568-69. The Court concluded that even if prejudice could be found in
allowing the uniformed security force to remain at the trial, the prejudice could be
outweighed by the “State’s legitimate interest in maintaining custody during the
proceedings . . . .” Id. at 571-72. Cf. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 505-06 (concluding that
requiring a defendant to wear prison clothing during trial does not promote any
legitimate state interest).
51
Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 624-25 (2005).
52
Id. at 625.
46
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proceedings, but his motions were repeatedly overruled.53 Deck
remained shackled throughout the sentencing proceedings and
was condemned to death.54 Deck appealed his sentence on the
grounds that his shackling violated Missouri law as well as the
U.S. Constitution.55 The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed
Deck’s sentence, concluding that first, the record did not reflect
that the jury saw or was aware of the shackles; second, Deck
did not argue that the shackles prevented him from
communicating with his attorney; and lastly, because Deck was
a repeat offender, there was evidence that he was a flight risk.56
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court stated
that the law had prohibited visible shackles during the guilt
phase of a criminal trial for many years.57 In Deck, the Court
extended this rule and held that this prohibition against
shackles at a criminal trial included the sentencing phases of a
defendant in a capital case.58 Accordingly, a state may only
shackle a criminal defendant when there is an “essential state
interest.”59 The majority opinion in Deck relied on prior case
law to set forth three guiding principles regarding the use
of shackles on criminal defendants.60 First, visible shackles
are “inherently prejudicial;”61 second, shackles may disrupt a

53

Id. The majority noted that the defendant’s attorney objected prior to,
during, and after jury voir dire, arguing that the jury was prejudiced by seeing the
defendant in shackles. Id. The sentencing court disagreed, noting that by keeping the
defendant in shackles the jury was relieved of any fear. Id.
54
Id. (citing State v. Deck, 136 S.W.3d 481, 485 (Mo. 2004) (en banc), rev’d on
other grounds, Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005)). Deck remained in shackles
throughout his trial, though the shackles were not visible to the jury. Id. at 624. He
was convicted and sentenced to death. However, at the conclusion of the trial, the
Missouri Supreme Court, upholding the conviction, set aside the sentence, thus leading
to the new sentencing proceeding. Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418, 432 (Mo. 2002) (en
banc), aff’d, 136 S.W.3d 481 (Mo. 2004), rev’d, Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005).
55
Deck, 544 U.S. at 625.
56
State v. Deck, 136 S.W.3d at 485-86.
57
Deck, 544 U.S. at 626.
58
Id. at 633. But see Brandon Dickerson, Casenote, Bidding Farewell to the
Ball and Chain: The United States Supreme Court Unconvincingly Prohibits Shackling
in the Penalty Phase in Deck v. Missouri, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 741, 743 (2006)
(arguing that the rule against visible shackling should not apply with equal force to the
sentencing phase and that the holding in Deck was based on “unconvincing reasoning
and unpersuasive dicta”).
59
Deck, 544 U.S. at 628 (citing “physical security, escape prevention, or
courtroom decorum” as examples of such essential interests).
60
The Court in Deck outlined the holdings in Holbrook, Allen, and Estelle
prior to setting forth the general rule that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
prohibit the use of visible shackles “absent a trial court determination . . . that they are
justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial.” Id. at 627-29.
61
Id. at 628 (citing Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568 (1986)).
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defendant’s ability to communicate with his counsel; and lastly,
shackles undermine the appearance of dignity in the courtroom
and jeopardize the tenet of innocent until proven guilty.62
The Supreme Court reflected on both legal history and
the practice of the majority of lower courts to support its
reasoning for prohibiting the use of visible shackles during the
sentencing phase of a defendant’s trial absent an essential
state interest. As the majority in Deck opined, the general
prohibition against visible shackles at trial is rooted in the
English common law rules.63 During the eighteenth century,
William Blackstone wrote that “the defendant must be brought
to the bar without irons, or any manner of shackles or bonds;
unless there be evident danger of an escape.”64 The Court
acknowledged that most trial courts have treaded close to this
standard. Moreover, the Court maintained that while lower
courts have differed on the procedures used to govern the
standard for shackling, they have adhered to the rule that,
barring a particular reason, the routine use of visible shackles
on defendants is unauthorized.65 Additionally, the Deck court
reasoned that this standard was embedded in the U.S.
Constitution’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of
due process.66
In sum, the Supreme Court has been entirely clear
that blanket policies requiring shackles on all defendants
are impermissible. Furthermore, the Court has expressed
unquestionable concern that visible shackles are prejudicial
and should only be used as a last resort. Moreover, the Court
recognized the significant impact shackles may have on the
62
Id. at 631; see also Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 569; Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S.
337, 344; People v. Harrington, 42 Cal. 165, 168 (1871).
63
Deck, 544 U.S. at 626.
64
Id. (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
317 (1769)). However, the Court acknowledged that the primary reason the common
law rule against shackles existed was to prevent physical harm to the defendant, and
in modern times physical harm is no longer a major concern. Id. at 630. Justice
Thomas’ dissent emphasizes this distinction between the justifications for the common
law rule and the modern principle on shackling to argue that the modern rule has no
resemblance to the original concerns about shackling. Id. at 635-40 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Furthermore, Thomas argues that the modern restraints are not physically
harmful and do not interfere with a defendant’s ability to defend himself at trial, the
paramount concerns during the common law days. Id. at 640. Therefore, Thomas
argues that the Court errs in equating modern day restraints with those used at the
time of common law and sets forth a standard that has no historical basis. Id. at 64041. This Note argues that physical harm is still a concern with shackling children. See
infra Part IV.C.
65
Deck, 544 U.S. at 628.
66
Id. at 627.
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dignity of the courtroom and the ability of the defendant to
communicate with counsel. Finally, in Deck, the Court took
notice that the lower courts have treated the case law from
Holbrook and Allen as declaring a constitutional standard
prohibiting the use of visible shackles unless there is an
apparent risk of danger or flight.67 For a variety of reasons,
which will be discussed in this Note, these standards are not
currently fully applied in juvenile cases.
III.

OBJECTIVES OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM

The juvenile justice system is premised upon the notion
of treatment and rehabilitation instead of punishment, with an
emphasis on individualized evaluations.68 While a shift over the
past two decades toward a focus on accountability has
permeated the juvenile court system, the underlying purpose of
rehabilitation has never completely disappeared.
A.

History of the Juvenile Court

A review of the history of the juvenile court is necessary
for understanding the principles that guided the juvenile
justice system. Further, the historical background reinforces
how shackling children in court undermines the goals of the
juvenile justice system. The first juvenile court was established
in Cook County, Illinois in 1899 in response to growing
concerns that children who violated the law were being treated
far too punitively.69 Social reformers believed children should
not be put through the criminal justice system in the same
fashion as adults.70 Moreover, the reformers did not believe
67
Id. at 629 (finding lower courts “have disagreed about the specific procedural steps a trial court must take prior to shackling, about the amount and type of
evidence needed to justify restraints, and about what forms of prejudice might warrant
a new trial, but they have not questioned the basic principle. They have emphasized
the importance of preserving trial court discretion . . . but they have applied the limits
on that discretion described in Holbrook, Allen, and the early English cases”).
68
See generally OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY GUIDELINES: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE IN
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY CASES 12 (2005) (explaining the history of the juvenile justice
system and the focus on rehabilitation and individualized justice); Julian W. Mack, The
Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909).
69
IRA SCHWARTZ, (IN)JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES: RETHINKING THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 150-51 (1989).
70
Id. at 150. The whole notion of setting up a separate court for juveniles is
akin to accepting the proposition that children are developmentally different from
adults and therefore have different needs. The differences between children and adults
continue to be the subject of research. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL & HUMAN RIGHTS
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children should have to face punishment and jail as a response
to their transgressions from the law.71 Instead, they decided to
create a special court for children based on a “rehabilitative
ideal.”72 As a result, the Illinois court focused on treatment and
rehabilitation of youths, promoting the best interests of the
child.73 Therefore, the judge explored children’s social and
emotional needs and attempted to provide services that would
help “save” the child.74 In exchange, due process considerations
and traditional adversarial proceedings were bypassed.75
In the two decades following the Illinois court, almost
all states created special courts for children.76 The parens
patriae77 concept provided the legal foundation for the juvenile
court system. Accordingly, the judge sat as a father figure and
provided guidance to the wayward youth. Thus, these courts
WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN
THE UNITED STATES 45-51 (2005) (discussing in detail the cognitive and psychosocial
differences between adults and children, including research on differences in brain
development suggesting that adolescents have a less-developed sense of impulse
control). Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the imposition of capital
punishment on individuals under age eighteen was prohibited by the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). In so doing, the
Court recognized that children are developmentally and emotionally different from
adults, less responsible for their actions, and more capable of change. See id. at 569-70.
71
The Progressives were a group of reformers who tackled concerns such as
women’s suffrage and child labor, along with the issue of juvenile offenders. See
SCHWARTZ, supra note 69, at 150. Their reforms came as a result of social problems
they saw as reflecting the changes from the Industrial Revolution. See id. The thought
behind the transformation in the juvenile court system was that juvenile offenders
should be treated like abused and neglected children and the state should serve to
protect these children. Mack, supra note 68, at 107.
72
SCHWARTZ, supra note 69, at 150.
73
Id. at 150-51. For a more detailed discussion of the history of the early
juvenile courts, see generally David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in
the Early Twentieth Century: Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A
CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 42, 42-73 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002).
74
Mack, supra note 68, at 108-10 (noting that numerous states followed the
Illinois example to establish new juvenile court laws); see also ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE
CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 3-4 (1969). In contrast to this new
juvenile system, the adult criminal system was adversarial in nature. The adult system
focused on punishment and jail as a response to crime. Notions of treatment and
rehabilitation were not recognized in the adult system. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 69,
at 150.
75
See Laurence Steinberg & Robert G. Schwartz, Developmental Psychology,
in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 9, 11
(Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000); Mack, supra note 68, at 109-10.
76
SCHWARTZ, supra note 69, at 151 (citing W. WADLINGTON ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 198 (1983)).
77
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1966). In Gault, Justice Fortas noted that
parens patriae is a Latin phrase “taken from chancery practice, where . . . it was used
to describe the power of the state to act in loco parentis for the purpose of protecting
the property interests and the person of the child. But there is no trace of the doctrine
in the history of criminal jurisprudence.” Id.
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espoused the principle that children, regardless of their status
as dependent, neglected, or delinquent most importantly
needed “state supervision in the manner of a wise and devoted
parent.”78 Additionally, the reformers and these special courts
for children pioneered the notion of “individualized justice,”
where courts focused on each child’s characteristics, background, and needs, and determined an appropriate treatment
plan to heal the child and enable him to participate in society.79
The system was intended to be informal.80 By crafting a system
that viewed children’s transgressions as something to be
treated as opposed to something worthy of punishment, there
was a justification in denying children the due process rights
and procedural safeguards that were the hallmark of the adult
criminal court system.81
Beginning in 1966, after nearly sixty years, the U.S.
Supreme Court had the opportunity to review this system, and
over the next five years, it handed down several decisions that
forever changed the landscape of juvenile justice in America.
Questioning the “naïve arrogance of the rehabilitative ideal,”82
the Court declared that “juveniles are entitled to a broad range
of procedural protections previously denied them.”83 Thus, the
initial phase of the juvenile court and its protectionist, “childsaving” mentality came to a close. However, in the decades
following the Supreme Court’s decision to provide juveniles
with certain procedural safeguards, the values propounded by
the social reformers continued to inform the emerging juvenile
justice system.84
78

ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST LAID PLANS: AMERICA’S JUVENILE COURT
EXPERIMENT 42 (1978).
79
OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY GUIDELINES: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
CASES 12 (2005).
80
See SCHWARTZ, supra note 69, at 151; see also, Barry C. Feld,
Criminalizing the Juvenile Court: A Research Agenda for the 1990’s, in JUVENILE
JUSTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY 59, 60-61 (Ira M. Schwartz ed., 1992).
81
SCHWARTZ, supra note 69, at 151. Schwartz comments:
The creators of the juvenile court envisioned that this special court for
children would be less like a court and more like a social welfare agency.
Children who were brought to the attention of the juvenile court were to be
helped rather than punished . . . . In exchange for this informality, they were
denied the rights and procedural safeguards accorded to adults.
Id.
82

FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 33 (2005).
SCHWARTZ, supra note 69, at 151.
84
See infra Part III.B. The Supreme Court in Gault emphasized that there
need not be a conflict between providing due process rights and the vision of a
83
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The Emergence of Due Process Rights

By granting certain due process rights to juveniles, the
Supreme Court sought to ensure that this population was
treated fairly in the juvenile court system.85 Despite the
benevolent goals of the social reformers, the informal juvenile
court system was not working.86 The Supreme Court first
confronted the problems of the juvenile court system in Kent v.
United States.87 Kent was the first of four landmark juvenile
justice cases that permanently altered the way juveniles were
treated in the legal system.88 In Kent, the Court addressed the
issue of waiver of jurisdiction89 from juvenile to adult court.90
The Court held that waiver of jurisdiction was a “critically
important action determining vitally important statutory
rights of the juvenile” and therefore required a statement of
rehabilitative court system for juveniles. 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967). But see Feld, supra note
80, at 62. Feld points out that despite the intervention of the U.S. Supreme Court,
legislative and judicial reforms have largely left juveniles with little of the protections
the social reformers had in mind. See id.
85
See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553-54 (1966) (holding that
transfer proceedings must comport with basic standards of due process and fair
treatment, while acknowledging the therapeutic nature of the juvenile court). But see
SCHWARTZ, supra note 69, at 159 (“The informality and confidentiality of juvenile court
proceedings and the broad discretion given to judges and other professionals working
in the court contributed to widespread abuses . . . . The situation is tantamount to
sacrificing the civil liberties of children in exchange for ‘good intentions.’”).
86
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543-44 (1971) (“[T]he fond and
idealistic hopes of the juvenile court proponents and early reformers of three
generations ago have not been realized.”).
87
See Kent, 383 U.S. at 541.
88
The four landmark cases are McKeiver, 403 U.S. 528, In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970), In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, and Kent, 383 U.S. 541.
89
Waiver of jurisdiction refers to the process by which a juvenile court may
decline to maintain jurisdiction of a juvenile court case and then transfer the case to
adult court. See Campaign for Youth Justice, Fact Sheet: Trying Youth as Adults, at 2,
http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/fact_sheets.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2008).
States’ waiver policies and proceedings vary. Id. at 2-3.
90
Kent involved the prosecution of a 16 year old for housebreaking, robbery
and rape. Kent, 383 U.S. at 543-44. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
convicted Kent of housebreaking and robbery. Id. at 550. Kent appealed, and the
judgment was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. See Kent v. United States, 343 F.2d 247, 261 (1964), rev’d, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
At trial, Kent’s attorney filed a motion for a hearing on the issue of waiver of Juvenile
Court jurisdiction along with an affidavit from a psychiatrist that recommended Kent
receive psychiatric treatment due to “severe psychopathology.” Kent, 383 U.S. at 545.
Kent’s attorney also filed a motion with the Juvenile Court to gain access to his client’s
social service filed arguing that access to the file was “essential to his providing
petitioner with effective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 546. The Juvenile Court judge did
not rule on the motions and declined to hold a hearing on waiver. Id. Instead he
ordered Kent to be tried in adult court stating that “after ‘full investigation, I do hereby
waive’ jurisdiction of petitioner . . . .” Id.
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reasons or considerations before a judge’s waiver of juvenile
jurisdiction.91 Additionally, the Court held that a juvenile is
entitled to counsel during the waiver proceeding and that
counsel must have a meaningful opportunity to participate in
the proceedings.92 While the Court’s holding in Kent emphasized the need for procedural safeguards in waiver proceedings,
the Court continued to acknowledge the therapeutic nature of
juvenile court. As the Court explained:
The Juvenile Court is theoretically engaged in determining the
needs of the child and of society rather than adjudicating criminal
conduct. The objectives are to provide measures of guidance and
rehabilitation for the child and protection for society, not to fix
criminal responsibility, guilt and punishment. The State is parens
patriae rather than prosecuting attorney and judge. But the
admonition to function in a “parental” relationship is not an
invitation to procedural arbitrariness.93

Thus, the Court expressed concern that juvenile proceedings,
while purporting to care for and attend to children’s needs,
actually do more harm than good. Justice Fortas ominously
predicted, “there may be grounds for concern that the child
receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the
protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and
regenerative treatment postulated for children.”94
The holding in Kent paved the way for the 1967 decision
In re Gault, the seminal case in juvenile jurisprudence, which
held that due process protections must be extended to juvenile

91
Kent, 383 U.S. at 556. The Court noted that while the statement need not
be “formal” or include “conventional findings of fact,” it must show that the statutory
requirement of a “full investigation” was met and “must set forth the basis for the order
with sufficient specificity to permit meaningful review.” Id. at 561.
92
Id. at 561. A meaningful opportunity to participate in the proceeding
requires, for example, that counsel has access to the child’s social records. Id.
93
Id. at 554-55. But, in the opinion, Justice Fortas also insisted that the
holding did not require that the “hearing to be held must conform with all of the
requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing.” Id. at
562.
94
Id. at 556. See generally Joel F. Handler, The Juvenile Court and the
Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 WIS. L. REV. 7 (1965)
(critiquing the goals of both the original reformers, who sought to eliminate the
adversary system, and the current reformers, who argue for more procedural
protections and propose a system that introduces procedures at the administrative
level with the opportunity for judicial oversight); David R. Barrett, William J. T.
Brown, & John M. Cramer, Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and
Individualized Justice, 79 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1966) (noting the criticism of the juvenile
courts and the concern that children may be “relinquish[ing] too many . . . rights in
exchange for an unfulfilled promise of treatment rather than punishment”).
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delinquency proceedings.95 These protections included the
rights to formal notice, appointed counsel, confrontation,
and cross-examination as well as the privilege against selfincrimination.96 In Gault, the Court drew a sharp distinction
between providing children with “careful, compassionate,
and individualized treatment,” and relaxed procedures that
deprive juveniles of key fundamental rights.97 Indeed the
Court declared, “[U]nbridled discretion, however benevolently
motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and
procedure.”98
Although Gault signified a shift in the approach of the
juvenile court system by providing youth with key procedural
safeguards, Gault did not, nevertheless, reject the rehabilitative model that provided the legal underpinnings of the
juvenile court.99 Gault did not suggest that the rehabilitative
model was inappropriate; rather, it contended that the system
had gone awry.100 The oft-cited quote from Justice Fortas
emphasizes this point. He famously remarked, “[T]he condition
of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court.”101 Indeed, the
Gault Court insisted, “the observance of due process standards,
intelligently and not ruthlessly administered, will not compel
the States to abandon or displace any of the substantive
benefits for the juvenile process.”102
Three years later, the Court held that every element of
a juvenile delinquency case must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in In re Winship.103 However, a year later the Court
stopped short of guaranteeing juveniles the full protections
95

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 1 (1967). Gault involved a fifteen-year-old boy
accused of making a lewd phone call to his neighbor. Id. at 4.
96
Id. at 33-34, 41, 55-57.
97
Id. at 18-19.
98
Id. at 18.
99
Id. at 21-22. But see ZIMRING, supra note 82, at 40-41 (offering an opposing
view that Gault and Winship reflect a departure from traditional juvenile court
jurisprudence). Zimring argues that if the purpose of the juvenile court is to intervene
for the child’s best interests, then the procedural safeguards introduced in Gault and
Winship pose a barrier to such aggressive intervention. Id. Furthermore, he argues
that providing procedural safeguards reflects a “diversionary justification” of the court,
in which the primary goal is diverting juveniles from the harsh results of the adult
criminal system. Id. at 35.
100
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 21-22.
101
Id. at 28.
102
Id. at 21.
103
397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970) (emphasizing again that “the observance of the
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt ‘will not compel the States to abandon or
displace any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process’” (citing In re Gault, 387
U.S. at 21)).
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afforded adults when it held in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania that
there is no constitutional right to a jury in juvenile court
proceedings.104 Returning to the rehabilitative and therapeutic underpinnings of the juvenile court system, the Court
concluded that a jury trial, “if required as a matter of
constitutional precept, will remake the juvenile proceedings
into a fully adversary process and will put an effective end to
what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal
protective proceeding.”105
By the early 1970s, the Court made a subtle return to
the original basis of the juvenile court system: to support,
protect, and foster rehabilitation in youth charged with
violating the law.106 The Court acknowledged the importance of
striking a “judicious balance” between providing procedural
safeguards in the juvenile court system and ensuring that the
system remains informal and focuses on rehabilitation rather
than punishment.107 In sum, the Court attempted to make a
bargain with children: courts would forego a fully adversarial
system complete with the full panoply of due process rights
afforded to defendants in the adult system, while in exchange
children would experience a court system that focused on their
unique backgrounds and needs. Moreover, the system would
continue to reject punishment in exchange for rehabilitative
services that assisted juveniles in restoring their lives.108
104

McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
Id. The Court emphasized that the “fond and idealistic hopes of the
juvenile court proponents and early reformers . . . have not been realized.” Id. at 54344. However, the Court blamed the failures of the system on “[t]he community’s
unwillingness to provide people and facilities and to be concerned, the insufficiency of
time devoted, the scarcity of professional help, the inadequacy of dispositional
alternatives, and our general lack of knowledge . . . .” Id. at 544.
106
Many critics of McKeiver argue that although the court stated that denying
juveniles the constitutional right to a jury trial was because the system should be
informal since the purpose was to “help” children, in reality the system was already
turning punitive and denying juveniles the right to a jury trial only served to penalize
them. See Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver:
Sentence Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of Justice in
Juvenile Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111, 1144-45, 1154 (2003). Furthermore,
much of the criticism of McKeiver hinges on the fact that juveniles do not have a right
to a jury trial, but through state and federal law, their juvenile adjudications may be
used against them for the purposes of a sentencing enhancement in adult criminal
court. See, e.g., id. at 1155 n.144 (citing numerous articles that are critical of
McKeiver).
107
McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545 (citing Commonwealth v. Johnson, 234 A.2d 9,
15 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967)).
108
One author has used the analogy that a “deal” was struck between juvenile
defendants and the State to provide juveniles with rehabilitation in exchange for
sacrificing certain due process rights. Douglas M. Schneider, But I was Just a Kid!:
105
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The routine and indiscriminate use of shackles on
juveniles violates the bargain courts struck with children in the
juvenile justice system—that in exchange for fewer procedural
protections, juveniles would be offered treatment and rehabilitative services.109 Therefore, the primary objective of the
juvenile justice system is to rehabilitate youth. However,
shackles run directly contrary to this goal. Shackles affect a
juvenile’s sense of right and wrong; cause physical and
psychological harm, stigma, and embarrassment; foster a sense
of distrust for the justice system; and teach children that

Does Using Juvenile Adjudications to Enhance Adult Sentences Run Afoul of Apprendi
v. New Jersey?, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 837, 840 (2005); see also Commonwealth v. Fisher,
62 A. 198, 200 (Pa. 1905) (holding that in order to “save a child from becoming a
criminal” the Legislature may bring the child to court “without any process at all, for
the purpose of subjecting it to the state’s guardianship and protection”). One of the
hallmarks of the juvenile court system is the flexible array of services available to
family court judges when adjudicating delinquent juveniles. Instead of only probation
or incarceration, which are so often the only choices in adult court, juvenile court
judges may choose from a variety of community based and alternative to incarceration
programs, along with residential treatment programs and secure detention facilities.
See MICHAEL A. CORRIERO, JUDGING CHILDREN AS CHILDREN: A PROPOSAL FOR A
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 132-35 (2006). Unfortunately, many scholars conclude that
despite intervention from the U.S. Supreme Court, the modern juvenile justice system
was and continues to be a failure. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 80, at 75-76 (discussing the
deplorable conditions of juvenile confinement historically and today as an example of
the juvenile court’s illusory commitment to rehabilitation).
109
Shackling is not the only practice that reflects a repudiation of the bargain
with juveniles to provide a less punitive system in exchange for depriving them of the
full panoply of due process rights. Indeed, beginning in the 1990s, there was a major
shift in the juvenile justice system toward a more punitive system. Referring to the
“criminalizing of the juvenile court,” Barry Feld argues that four key developments led
to a tightening of the juvenile justice system and an emphasis on punishment and just
deserts. Feld, supra note 80, at 62. Those developments were the “removal of status
offenders [from juvenile jurisdiction], waiver of serious offenders to the adult system,
increased punitiveness, and procedural formality.” Id. Other indications that the
juvenile justice system became more punitive are legislative initiatives in the 1990s
implemented to criminalize youth and their offenses, the increase in juvenile
placement to residential facilities, and the increase in the number of delinquency cases
that were transferred to criminal courts. David R. Katner, The Mental Health
Paradigm and the MacArthur Study: Emerging Issues Challenging the Competence of
Juveniles in Delinquency Systems, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 503, 504 (2006); see also
ZIMRING, supra note 82, at 44-47; Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime? Prospects for
Restorative Justice in the United States, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 413, 415-18 (2003); Randall
T. Salekin et al., Juvenile Transfer to Adult Courts: A Look at the Prototypes for
Dangerousness, Sophistication-Maturity, and Amenability to Treatment Through a
Legal Lens, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 373, 373-74 (2002); Schneider, supra note 108,
at 840 (arguing that the use of a juvenile adjudication as a prior offense for purposes of
a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act violates the “deal”
that was struck between juveniles and the State to provide juveniles with
rehabilitation in exchange for certain procedural rights).
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they will be treated like criminals.110 In this section, I begin
with a discussion of the extent to which courts require children
to appear in shackles. Next, I will address the justifications
offered for shackling and explain why these justifications
neither represent essential interests significant enough to
merit shackling juveniles nor outweigh the detrimental effects
shackling has on juveniles. Then, I will examine the physical
and psychological harms shackles cause to children. Finally, I
will briefly examine the right to treatment afforded to children
in rehabilitative facilities, why this right should apply with
equal force when children are going through juvenile court
proceedings, and how shackling children violates this right to
treatment.
A.

Shackling: Extent of the Practice

While litigation on shackling is sparse, reports from
local courtrooms around the country indicate that shackling is
a pervasive practice in juvenile court proceedings.111 In twenty
eight states, some juvenile courts routinely require juveniles to
remain in shackles throughout their court proceedings.112
Anecdotal evidence from juvenile defenders around the country
provides examples of the routine use of shackles on juveniles. A
survey of defender offices in Florida revealed that in some
counties, the practice of requiring children to wear shackles
during juvenile court proceedings has persisted for over twenty
years. While in other counties the practice is relatively new,
and courts have implemented the system of shackling children
over the past five years.113 Additionally, the Director of Juvenile
110

See infra Part IV.C.
Through the assistance of Bob Boruchowitz, Visiting Clinical Professor of
Law at Seattle University Law School, I submitted a brief survey with seven questions
on shackling practices to the American Council of Chief Defenders ListServe. The
seven questions asked were (1) Does the courtroom where you practice shackle
juveniles? (2) What, if any, criteria are used to determine whether a juvenile should be
shackled? (3) Does your courtroom use “restraint boxes” or “restraint belts” on
juveniles? (4) Do any of the state run programs (detention/treatment) require juveniles
remain in shackles while they are waiting for their court appearances? (5) If yes, are
the shackles removed once the juvenile is in front of the judge? (6) What, if any, types
of arguments have you made in opposition to the use of shackles on juveniles you
represented in court? (7) What has the court ruled? Finally, we also asked respondents
to share any copies of pleadings and of the court’s rulings. The survey produced a small
number of responses, not sufficient to draw systemic conclusions, but consistent with
observations reflected in news articles and cases discussed in this Note.
112
Moore, supra note 15, at 1A.
113
Carlos Martinez, Why Are Children in Florida Treated as Enemy Combatants? CORNERSTONE, May-Aug. 2007, at 10-11, available at http://www.pdmiami.com/
111
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Delinquency Defense in Hartford, Connecticut reported that all
children in juvenile court proceedings are shackled and there is
no individualized determination of danger or risk of flight.114
Instead, the Connecticut courts allowed the judicial marshals,
who provide courtroom security, to make determinations about
safety risk and whether shackles were necessary.115 Furthermore, all juveniles coming from outside programs run by the
Connecticut Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) are
required to wear restraint belts, even those who are in secure
holding rooms.116
The policy reported in Louisville, Kentucky juvenile
courts is similar to Hartford’s.117 The Chief Public Defender for
Louisville-Jefferson County noted that all juvenile court
defendants are required to be in handcuffs at all times while in
the courtroom.118 There is no individualized determination of
danger or risk of flight.119 Furthermore, defenders’ motions to
oppose shackling are frequently denied on the grounds that the
sheriff’s department is in charge of courtroom security, and the
department sets the policy about shackling or otherwise
restraining juvenile defendants.120
In other state counties, it is common practice to shackle
all juveniles who are “in custody,” which includes children
detained in a local facility and children in the custody of the
state juvenile prison.121 In these counties, the shackles are not
NLADACornerstoneMartinezArticleMay-Aug2007.pdf) (citing Miami-Dade County
Public Defenders Office survey of public defender offices throughout Florida).
114
E-mail from Christine Rapillo, Director of Juvenile Delinquency Defense at
the Office of the Chief Public Defender in Hartford, Connecticut, to Bob Boruchowitz,
Visiting Clinical Professor of Law at Seattle University Law School (Oct. 29, 2007, 7:46
a.m.) (on file with author).
115
Id. Rapillo noted that last year a policy was issued requiring an
individualized determination of danger by a judge before a child could be shackled in
court. Id. However, she reported that this practice has stopped in favor of leaving the
decision up to the Judicial Marshalls. Id.
116
Id. A restraint belt is made out of leather and has metal rings at the front.
The strap goes around a child’s waist and the rings are connected to the handcuffs by a
chain, thus having the effect of limiting a child’s range of movement. Complaint, Jenny
P., supra note 1, ¶ 20.
117
E-mail from Daniel T. Goyette, Louisville Metro Public Defender to Bob
Boruchowitz, Visiting Clinical Professor of Law at Seattle University Law School (Oct.
29, 2007, 7:47 a.m.) (on file with author).
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
E-mail from Christina Phillis, Juvenile Division Manager of the Maricopa
County Defenders Office to James Haas, Maricopa County Public Defender (Oct. 28,
2007, 5:49 a.m.) (on file with author) [hereinafter Phillis e-mail]; e-mail from Kay
Locke, Managing Attorney of the Juvenile Division of the Montgomery County Ohio
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removed when the children are in the courtroom and before
the judge.122 Again, public defenders note that the decision to
leave the shackles on during court proceedings is largely based
on recommendations from law enforcement, as opposed to
individualized determinations by the judge.123 Moreover, when
attorneys oppose the use of shackles, the courts rarely grant
the motions on the grounds that there is no issue of prejudicing
the trier of fact since there are no jury trials in these
proceedings.124
In contrast, some localities have been successful in
arguing against the routine and indiscriminate use of shackles
on juveniles. For example, in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, juveniles are not shackled unless they are “deemed to be
a serious threat to the public.”125 If they are deemed to be a
serious threat, the Probation Officer must seek the judge’s
approval to shackle the juvenile.126 Juvenile defender Ron Turo
explained “Since he instituted this policy approximately two
years ago, we [the county] have only two to three shacklings
out of hundreds of detained children.”127
Florida has conducted the most recent public campaign
against shackling juveniles.128 Over the past year, public
Public Defender’s Office, to Bob Boruchowitz, Visiting Clinical Professor of Law at
Seattle University Law School (Oct. 29, 2007, 11:14 a.m.) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Locke e-mail]. Phillis and Locke both reported this practice in their
juvenile courts. Phillis noted that juveniles in residential treatment, as opposed to
detention or jail, are not required to wear shackles when they appear in court. Phillis
e-mail, supra.
122
Kay Locke of Montgomery County, Ohio indicated that shackles remain on
during hearings unless the judge, in his discretion, agrees to remove them. Locke
e-mail, supra note 121. However, it is unpredictable whether or not judges will agree to
have shackles removed and the decision to remove shackles is not based on any
particular criteria. Id.
123
Id. (indicating that judges have stated that the practice of routine
shackling “originates from the Sheriff’s Department”). Locke further notes a pendulum
swing effect where judges may order shackles removed once children are in the
courtroom, but once there is an incident of running or violence by a child, every child is
shackled for the next few months. Id. Then shackles may be removed until the next
“incident.” Id.
124
Phillis e-mail, supra note 121. Phillis noted that “[o]n rare occasion[s] a
judge may grant an oral motion to remove the shackles and handcuffs of the very
young.” Id.
125
E-mail from Ron Turo, Juvenile Defender in Cumberland County
Pennsylvania to Bob Boruchowitz, Visiting Clinical Professor of Law at Seattle
University Law School (Oct. 29, 2007, 9:44 a.m.) (on file with author).
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
The Public Defender’s Office in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida has
explicitly argued that the indiscriminate use of shackles is “inconsistent with the
rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile justice system.” Memorandum from Marie
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defenders in Miami have been fighting the blanket policy of
shackling all juveniles throughout their entire court proceedings.129 The attorneys initially attempted to work with
court administrators to end the practice.130 However, once the
talks proved unsuccessful, they filed over one hundred motions
in the Miami juvenile courts requesting that their clients be
allowed to appear in court without shackles.131 Ultimately, the
judges began hearing and granting the individual motions.132
Additionally, in New York, the Legal Aid Society
brought a lawsuit against the Office of Children and Family
Services (“OCFS”) to challenge its policy of shackling all
juveniles in its custody and requiring them to remain in
shackles while they await their court appearance and when in
front of the judge.133 This challenge was successful in that the
New York Supreme Court granted a temporary restraining
order requiring that John F. appear in court without shackles
on December 13, 2007 or any other date on which he was to
appear in court, unless there was an individualized assessment
demonstrating that he posed a “serious evident danger to
himself and others.”134 In addition, the court signed a
stipulation and order between the Legal Aid Society and OCFS
Osborne, Chief, Juvenile Div., Pub. Defender’s Office, Eleventh Judicial Circuit of
Florida, Memorandum to Honorable Lester Langer (May 17, 2006), available at
http://www.pdmiami.com/unchainthechildren/Appendix_B_Memo_to_Hon_Judge_Langer
_re_Shackling.pdf.
129
Martinez, supra note 113, at 10; see also Bennett H. Brummer et al.,
Public Defender’s Office, Sample Motion for Child to Appear Free from Degrading
and Unlawful Restraints, 10-16, 2006, available at http://www.pdmiami.com/
unchainthechildren/Motion_for_Child_to_Appear_Free_from_Degrading_and_Unlawful
_Restraints.pdf (arguing that shackling is harmful to children and is contrary to the
principles of Florida’s juvenile justice system).
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
See Jon Burstein, Detained Children Will Not Be Shackled in Courtrooms, Judges Rule, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 26, 2006, available at http://
www.pdmiami.com/Detained_juveniles_will_not_be_shackled.htm. Courts in Broward
County also ordered judges to discontinue blanket shackling policies. Nikki Waller,
Shackling of Kids Curtailed in Broward Courtrooms, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 25,
2006, available at http://www.pdmiami.com/Herald-Shackling_of_kids_curtailed_in_
Broward.htm. But see Kathleen Chapman, Judges Refuse to Unshackle Juveniles, PALM
BEACH POST, Feb. 2, 2007, available at http://www.pdmiami.com/Palm_Beach_PostJudges_refuse_to_unshackle_juveniles.pdf (reporting on Palm Beach County juvenile
judges’ refusal to remove shackles from juveniles in their courtrooms).
133
John F. v. Carrion, No. 07/407117 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 12, 2007). The Legal
Aid Society is currently “engaged in expedited settlement talks” with OCFS. Telephone
interview with Nancy Rosenbloom, Director of Special Litigation and Law Reform Unit,
Legal Aid Society, New York City (Apr. 28, 2007).
134
Order to Show Cause for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order at 2, John F., No. 07/407117.
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whereby OCFS agreed to apply any final judgment on this
matter to all similarly situated defendants.135
Thus, while there have been successful challenges to the
practice of routinely shackling juveniles in court, many
jurisdictions continue to apply blanket policies without any
showing of need. This system is in direct conflict with the
constitutional rule established in Deck v. Missouri136 and is also
undermined by the existing case law on shackling children in
juvenile court.137 The blanket policies are further discredited by
the fact that the justifications offered for shackling juveniles do
not rise to the level of an essential state interest and ignore the
policy and purpose behind the juvenile justice system.
B.

Justifications Offered for Shackling Juveniles

There are three main justifications that are routinely
offered for the indiscriminate use of shackles on juveniles:
(1) the need for courtroom security and the dearth of court
resources to maintain security; (2) the lack of concern for
prejudice because of the absence of jury trials; and (3) the
potential for shackling to serve as a deterrent to future
criminal conduct by detained youth.138 These justifications fail
to demonstrate the “essential state interest” requirement
established in Holbrook v. Flynn and reiterated in Deck.139
Further, none of these stated justifications outweighs the
detrimental physical and psychological harm shackling causes
to juveniles.
Some courts have suggested that security in the courtroom and courthouse should be considered when determining
whether shackles are appropriate.140 One court gave deference
135

Stipulation and Order at 2, John F., No. 07/407117.
See supra Part II.C.
137
See infra Part V.
138
See In re Staley, 352 N.E.2d. 3, 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (discussing jury
prejudice), aff’d 364 N.E.2d 72 (1977); State v. Merrell, 12 P.3d 556, 559-60 (Or. Ct.
App. 2000) (discussing lack of court resources); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of
Multnomah County v. Millican, 906 P.2d 857, 860-61 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (discussing
jury prejudice); State v. E.J.Y., 55 P.3d 673, 679 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (discussing jury
prejudice); Martinez, supra note 113, at 11 (discussing courtroom security).
139
See supra Part II.B-C.
140
Martinez, supra note 113, at 11-12; see also Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622,
624 (2005) (recognizing that the need to maintain order and security may suffice as an
“essential state interest” to justify the use of visible shackles). However, in Deck, the
Court was talking about maintaining courtroom security “specific to the defendant on
trial” as opposed to a general desire to maintain security. Id.; see In re R.W.S. 728
N.W.2d 326, 331 (N.D. 2007) (holding that the trial judge failed to properly exercise his
136
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to the bailiff’s position regarding the positive impact shackling
had on courtroom security and decorum, instead of making an
individualized determination for the child.141 Other arguments
focused on the notion that children are impulsive and difficult
to control, and therefore shackling is necessary to minimize
fights and maintain security.142
In contrast, in Tiffany A. v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles County,143 the California Courts of Appeal expressly
stated that the “source of the ‘need,’” to justify the use of
shackles must come from a record of violence or threat of
violence by the accused.144 There, the prosecution and the
sheriff’s department’s main reasons for asserting that every
juvenile needed to be shackled were the absence of sufficient
security personnel and the design of the Lancaster courthouse.145 However, the California Courts of Appeal concluded
that a lack of courtroom personnel is not a sufficient justification for requiring a juvenile to appear in shackles during
his or her proceedings.146 This justification for courtroom
security fails to acknowledge less restrictive means other than
shackling that could achieve the same goal of security.
discretion when a juvenile requested that his shackles be removed during an
adjudicatory hearing). In In re R.W.S., the North Dakota Supreme Court found that a
trial judge may not rely on conclusory statements made by law enforcement regarding
a serious risk of dangerous behavior as a substitute for an individual analysis. Id.
However, the court also explained that the security situation at the courtroom and
courthouse is just one of the factors that a juvenile court should consider when
determining whether or not to require the juvenile to appear in shackles. Id. Similarly,
in In re Staley, the Illinois Court of Appeals also indicated that courtroom security
could be one factor justifying the use of shackles. 352 N.E.2d. at 6. In this case, fifteenyear-old Staley was alleged to have committed aggravated battery for his involvement
in a fight that occurred between another youth and staff members at a detention home.
Id. at 5. Staley challenged his delinquency adjudication on the grounds that he was
denied a fair hearing because he had been required to appear in handcuffs throughout
his hearing. Id.
141
S.Y. v. McMillan, 563 So. 2d 807, 808-09 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
142
Martinez, supra note 113, at 11. The Florida attorneys successfully
litigated the issue, and currently over 95% of the juveniles represented in Miami
appear without shackles in front of all four juvenile court judges. Id. at 10. Since the
first motion filed over 3000 children have appeared in court and there have been no
incidents of violence or escape attempts. Id.
143
59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). Here, Tiffany A. got involved in
the California Juvenile Court system for allegedly unlawfully taking a vehicle that did
not belong to her. Throughout the course of the case, Tiffany A. objected to the
requirement that she appear in court in shackles. Id. at 366.
144
Id. at 372 (emphasis in original) (citing People v. Cox, 809 P.2d 351 (Cal.
1991) (reaffirming People v. Duran, 545 P.2d 1322 (Cal. 1976)).
145
Id. at 374.
146
Id. at 372 (“We note that no California State court case has enforced the
use of physical restraints based solely on the defendants’ status in custody, the lack of
courtroom security personnel or the inadequacy of the court facilities.”).
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Specifically, in Holbrook v. Flynn, the Supreme Court put
forward the option of additional armed security guards as a
less prejudicial alternative to shackling a defendant in order to
ensure security.147 Moreover, the absence of sufficient resources
to address the courtroom security concerns is not an
appropriate reason to require all children to appear shackled in
court and does not satisfy the “essential state interest”
requirement established in Holbrook and reiterated in Deck.148
Another justification for blanket shackling policies is
that juvenile proceedings do not involve a jury, so there is no
concern that shackles will create prejudice in the fact-finder.
The theory espoused by courts, prosecutors, and courtroom
personnel is that because juveniles do not have the right to a
jury trial, there is a diminished concern that shackles will
serve to prejudice the fact-finder.149 However, since judges in
juvenile court proceedings serve as the triers of fact, they will,
arguably, be susceptible to prejudice, as are juries. Accordingly,
in Tiffany A. the California Courts of Appeal held that the
concern of prejudice is applicable even where there is no jury
presence.150 The court distinguished on numerous grounds
United States v. Howard,151 a Ninth Circuit decision upholding
a district court policy to shackle all in-custody defendants

147

See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.C.
149
See, e.g., In re Staley, 352 N.E.2d 3, 7-8 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (Stengel, J.,
dissenting); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Multnomah County v. Millican, 906 P.2d
857, 860-61 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that the shackling of the defendant was
harmless error as there was no indication “that trial court’s credibility determinations
were impermissibly skewed” by the presence of shackles); State v. E.J.Y., 55 P.3d 673,
679 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (finding that the shackling of the defendant was harmless
error in a bench trial in part because there was no risk of prejudice from viewing
restraints by a jury).
150
Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 370-72. The court relied on both People v.
Fierro, 821 P.2d 1302 (Cal. 1991), and Solomon v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. Rptr. 1 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1981), in holding that shackling is prejudicial even during a proceeding
without a jury. Id. at 371. In both Fierro and Solomon, the courts considered the use of
physical restraints on adult defendants during preliminary hearings where no jury was
present. Fierro, 821 P.2d at 1321; Solomon, 177 Cal. Rptr. At 1-2. In both cases the
courts held that the principles from People v. Duran, 545 P.2d 1322, 1327 (Cal. 1976),
holding that shackling a criminal defendant prejudicially affects the defendant’s
constitutional right to be presumed innocent, applied to proceedings without a jury.
Fierro, 821 P.2d at 1322; Solomon, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 3. But see United States v.
Howard, 480 F.3d 1005, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that use of shackles on
criminal defendants during pretrial hearings where no jury is present is permissible
because there is no concern of prejudice when the defendant only appears in front of a
judge); United States v. Zuber, 118 F.3d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 1997) (same).
151
480 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2007).
148
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during their first appearances in front of a federal magistrate.152
Most relevant to the jury prejudice issue, the court in Tiffany
A. noted that Howard considered only individuals shackled for
their first appearances.
In contrast, Tiffany A. considered the use of shackles on
juveniles at every appearance in the Lancaster juvenile
delinquency court.153 Juvenile judges sit as triers of fact,
making crucial determinations regarding a juvenile’s future.
Among other consequences, juveniles can spend multiple years
in detention facilities as the result of a juvenile adjudication.
The nature of this proceeding is clearly distinguishable from a
first appearance or arraignment in front of a magistrate judge,
and therefore concerns about prejudice are certainly applicable,
thus affecting the policy on shackling children in juvenile court.
A final justification for routine shackling of juveniles is
that shackling may serve as a deterrent for detained children.
The theory is that upon viewing each other in shackles and
handcuffs, children will no longer want to commit crimes so
they can avoid being treated like they were in court.154 This
argument strongly suggests that shackling is a deterrent
because of its shame, humiliation, and punitive effects.155
Juvenile defenders and scholars note that there is no evidence
to suggest that shackling juveniles is an effective deterrent to
juvenile crime.156 Moreover, such motives for shackling are in
stark opposition to the goals of the juvenile justice system.157 To
require shackling as a form of punishment in the hopes of
deterring children from violating the law is unconscionable in
light of the historical mission of the juvenile court system to
provide treatment for juvenile offenders.

152

Id. at 1013-14.
Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 375; see also Millican, 906 P.2d at 861
(DeMuniz, J., dissenting) (“[U]nnecessarily shackling children in a delinquency hearing
is presumptively prejudicial . . . .”).
154
Martinez, supra note 113, at 11.
155
Indeed, punishment has no place in the adult criminal system prior to the
determination of guilt. The American judicial system is predicated on a presumption of
innocence. In Deck v. Missouri, the Supreme Court noted that the use of visible
shackles undermines this central tenet of our justice system. 544 U.S. 622, 631 (2005).
156
See, e.g., Martinez, supra note 113, at 11.
157
See supra Part III (discussing the purpose of the juvenile justice system to
treat and rehabilitate juveniles). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized that
deterrence may not have the same effect on juveniles as it has on adults. See Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) (“[T]he absence of evidence of deterrent effect is of
special concern because the same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable
than adults suggest as well that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence.”).
153
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Routine shackling goes against the Supreme Court’s
holding in Deck that such blanket policies deny individual
defendants of a fair trial.158 Further, the justifications offered in
support of routinely shackling children in court fall short of
meeting an “essential state interest.”159 Despite the absence of a
jury, the judge may still be susceptible to prejudice from
stigma-laden shackles. Further, in McKeiver, juveniles were
denied the right to a jury trial under the premise that the
juvenile court system would be rehabilitative and less formal
and adversarial.160 To now justify a punitive measure such
as shackling because there is no concern for jury prejudice
belies the reasoning behind McKeiver and unfairly uses this
procedural denial against children.
C.

How Shackling Harms Children

It seems axiomatic that the use of shackles does not
serve a treatment or rehabilitative purpose.161 In fact, it is
generally accepted that shackling children causes both physical
and psychological harm.162 However, there is a general silence
about the practice of routinely shackling children throughout
their juvenile court appearances in both case law and scholarly
work.163 Therefore the research discussed in this section
about the negative effects of shackling children comes from
professionals who study the use of restraints on children in
juvenile justice facilities and psychiatric treatment centers.
While the Supreme Court in Deck acknowledged that
the issue of physical harm with shackles may no longer be a
relevant concern for adults,164 the potential for physical harm is
still a pressing concern with respect to children. Shackling can
cause physical harm: children who have been required to wear
shackles complain of bruising, cuts, and pain around their

158

Deck, 544 U.S. at 624.
Id. at 628-29.
160
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545-46 (1971).
161
See supra Part IV.B (discussing the justifications for shackling juveniles).
162
See infra Part IV.C.
163
See infra Part V.A (discussing case law acknowledging the negative effects
of shackling on juveniles); John William Tobin, Time to Remove the Shackles: The
Legality of Restraints on Children Deprived of Their Liberty Under International Law,
9 INT’L J. OF CHILD. RTS. 213, 213, 221 (2001) (arguing that the use of shackles on
children is “barbaric” and deprives them of due process rights, and specifically that
children should only appear in court in restraints in “exceptional circumstances”).
164
See supra Part II.C.
159
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wrists and ankles.165 Moreover, because young people are going
through a critical time in their physical development, experts
caution that personnel must take caution to avoid damaging
children’s growth plates.166 But, even if a gentler type of shackle
could be developed that could lessen the pain and the potential
for physical damage, there are other compelling reasons to
severely limit the use of shackles on children, namely, the
traumatic and psychological impact it has on young people.
Indeed, it is generally accepted by medical and mental
health professionals that shackling and physical restraints
should only be used on juveniles as a last resort.167 The
American Psychiatric Association advises that even when
restraints are needed to protect a child, staff should continue to
work with the young person to assess the underlying issues
resulting in the poor behavior.168 Further, children in the
juvenile justice system have a high prevalence of psychiatric
disorders.169 In particular, girls have extraordinarily high
incidents of having experienced physical and sexual abuse.170
Accordingly, experts suggest that the use of restraints may
be “retraumatizing” for young people who have experienced
violence or trauma in their lives or are going through stressful
experiences.171 Moreover, the National Center for Mental
165

See Complaint, Jenny P., supra note 1, at 15, 20.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM DIRECTORS
MEDICAL DIRECTORS COUNCIL, REDUCING THE USE OF SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT
PART II 8 (2001), available at http://www.nasmhpd.org/general_files/publications/
med_directors_pubs/Seclusion_Restraint_2.pdf; see also Brummer et al., supra note
129, app. F ¶ 12 (Aug. 28, 2006) (affidavit describing physical harm that shackling causes children), available at http://www.pdmiami.com/unchainthechildren/
AppendixFDrGwen%20Wurm.pdf.
167
See, e.g., id.; AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, THE USE OF RESTRAINT
AND SECLUSION IN CORRECTIONAL MENTAL HEALTH CARE 4 (2006), available at
http://archive.psych.org/edu/other_res/lib_archives/archives/200605.pdf.; Howard Bath,
The Physical Restraint of Children: Is It Therapeutic?, 64 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 40,
41, 48 (1994); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
CUSTODY AND CONTROL: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT IN NEW YORK’S JUVENILE
PRISONS FOR GIRLS 45-46 (2006) [hereinafter CUSTODY AND CONTROL], available at
http://hrw.org/reports/2006/us0906/.
168
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 167, at 4 (“[R]estraint for
protective reasons . . . does not take the place of efforts to understand and address the
causes of the aberrant behavior. In most uses of . . . restraint, the staff should have
considered or tried less restrictive means of control . . . .”).
169
LINDA A. TEPLIN ET AL., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS OF
YOUTH IN DETENTION 2 (2006), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/210331.pdf.
170
CUSTODY AND CONTROL, supra note 167, at 4-5.
171
Julian D. Ford et al., Trauma and Youth in the Juvenile Justice System:
Critical Issues and New Directions, NATIONAL CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH AND
JUVENILE JUSTICE RESEARCH AND PROGRAM BRIEF, June 2007, at 1, 3; see also
166
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Health and Juvenile Justice (“NCMHJJ”) cautions that
“traumatic stress symptoms may worsen as a result of juvenile
justice system involvement.”172 The NCMHJJ further notes that
“[c]ourt hearings, detention, and incarceration are inherently
stressful, and stressful experiences that are not traumatic per
se can exacerbate trauma symptoms.”173 Thus, children in the
juvenile justice system are particularly vulnerable. The
imposition of shackles on a young person may exacerbate
feelings of isolation and hopelessness, thereby frustrating the
purpose of the juvenile justice system.
Given the awareness about the negative impacts of
shackling, the Council of Juvenile Correctional Administrators
(“CJCA”) adheres to specific guidelines for determining when
the use of physical restraints on juvenile offenders is appropriate.174 These guidelines emphasize the limited situations
when physical restraints might be appropriate, the types of
personnel who should apply restraints on children, the
duration for which restraints should be used, and appropriate
follow-up care.175 Further, these statements suggest that the
Brummer et al., supra note 129, app. D ¶ 18 (Aug. 23, 2006) (affidavit discussing
traumatic impact of shackling on children who have been abused), available at
http://www.pdmiami.com/unchainthechildren/AppendixDBeyer.pdf.
172
Id. at 3.
173
Id.
174
The CJCA is a national not-for-profit organization whose mission, in part,
is to “improve local juvenile correctional services, programs, and practices.”
http://cjca.net/AboutUs.aspx?~SUQ9ZjRhMjhmMDUtNTM2OS00OGMzLTlhNDAtZTE
zOTNkYjQ1MzVk. See Council of Juvenile Correctional Administrators, Position Paper
on Physical and Mechanical Interventions with Juvenile Offenders (2003), available at
http://cjca.net/photos/content/documents/Interventions.pdf.
175
The five CJCA guidelines are:
1. Use of physical interventions or restraints is a last resort and should
always follow the prudent preventative use of screening, classification and
programmatic interventions;
2. Physical intervention and/or restraints should only be deployed when deescalation of the crisis has failed and the need to protect staff, other youths or
the jurisdiction’s property is necessary;
3. At such time that those preventive measures fail, physical interventions
and restraints should only be done by trained individuals and only used
defensively and in a manner that provides maximum safety for the staff and
youths;
4. Use of physical or other intrusive intervention methods should only
continue as long as the youth presents a danger to self, other or property;
5. Medical, mental health and /or administrative case reviews of
interventions deployed should be apart of the quality assurance process and
required.
Id.
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use of physical restraints and shackles on children is not to be
taken lightly. Restraints are dangerous and may have serious
traumatic effects on a child. Therefore, they should not be used
routinely and indiscriminately as a stopgap measure to ensure
safety in an aging courtroom or to prevent the potential for
unruly behavior where no indication of the potential for such
behavior is present.
Beyond the physical and psychological trauma caused
by shackles, requiring juveniles to appear in court with visible
shackles is an affront to their moral identity and sense of self.
Children and adolescents are in a particularly fragile state of
development.176 Many young people struggle with their selfimage and feelings of insecurity. Exacerbating these feelings of
uncertainty, visible shackles cause embarrassment and
shame.177 Moreover, they brand juveniles as violent and
dangerous criminals. These negative messages are not only
hurtful; they contravene the values the juvenile justice system
is supposed to present.
Finally, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) publication on juvenile justice standards does not discuss the use of
visible shackles on juveniles in court, and instead focuses on
how juvenile detention facilities should be designed in order
to foster rehabilitation.178 This logical disconnect between
treatment outside of the system and shackling in court is
176
See generally ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968)
(describing the stages of identity development that adolescents experience). Recently,
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the imposition of capital punishment on individuals
under age eighteen was prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Roper
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). In so doing, the Court recognized that children
are developmentally and emotionally different from adults, less responsible for their
actions and more capable of change. Id. at 569-70. The Court noted that there are three
main differences between juveniles under 18 and adults. Id. at 569. First, juveniles are
less mature and have an “underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” id. (quoting Johnson
v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)); second, juveniles are “more vulnerable or
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure,” id.
(citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)); and, third, the “character of a
juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. The personality traits of juveniles are
more transitory, less fixed,” id. at 570.
177
See, e.g., Complaint, Jenny P., supra note 1, at 10, 18.
178
See generally INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION & AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, ANNOTATED: A BALANCED APPROACH
(Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., ed., 1996) [hereinafter STANDARDS]. In a section entitled
“Corrections,” the Standards briefly mention “restraints” when addressing residential
programs. Id. at 52. Section 7.8 addresses limitations on restraints and weapons. Id.
“Given the small size of programs, it should not be necessary to use mechanical
restraints within the facility. The program director may authorize the use of
mechanical restraints during transportation only.” Andrew Rutherford & Fred Cohen,
Standards Relating to Corrections Administration, in STANDARDS, supra, at 29, 52.
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another type of psychological effect of shackling on children. It
is confusing and illogical to treat children punitively when they
are going through courtroom proceedings and then establish
firm guidelines to ensure a therapeutic environment once the
youngsters are adjudicated.
The ABA standards spend considerable time detailing
the architectural and interior design of juvenile facilities
and the types of values the designs should promote.179 The
standards discuss a range of facilities from secure corrections
and detention facilities, to group home and residential treatment centers.180 In general, the Standards guide facilities to
promote “normalization.”181 They emphasize that while children
are going through the juvenile court system, juvenile facilities
do not need to reinforce a notion of criminality. Further, even
regarding secure detention facilities, the Standards implore
that these facilities should “provide a pleasant environment.”182
Thus, the ABA recommends that the juvenile justice system
resemble a treatment setting, as opposed to a prison. The
atmosphere should be calming and “normalizing” rather than
promote a feeling of deviance or isolation in the children.
Requiring children to routinely appear shackled in court makes
no sense given these standards.
The general silence on the issue of shackling children in
court does not suggest that the practice is inconsequential.
Rather, it demonstrates that most professionals are focused
on the post-adjudicative or disposition183 phase of a child’s
experience in juvenile court. Perhaps the emphasis has been on
this phase because judges and scholars are trying to ensure
179

See Allen M. Greenberger, Standards Relating to Architecture of Facilities,
in STANDARDS, supra note 178, at 19, 21.
180
Id. at 20.
181
Id. at 21. “Normalization” is defined as “[e]nabling juveniles within the
juvenile justice system to project an image that does not mark them as deviant.” Id.
at 19.
182
Id. at 27. A secure detention facility is designed to house accused juveniles
and to prevent them from leaving at will. Id. at 25. Each state has different policies on
when a child will be required to reside in a secure detention facility. As opposed to
secure detention, many juveniles remain in the community in their homes and are
expected to report to court with a parent or guardian for each appearance. Those
juveniles who are dangerous, do not comply with court orders, or are at risk of flight,
may be required by the judge to stay in a detention facility during the adjudication
process.
183
In juvenile court the terms “adjudication” and “disposition” are substituted
for “conviction” and “sentence.” This shift in language underscores the intended
differences between juvenile court and the adult system. Children in the juvenile court
system are not actually being convicted of a crime or sentenced to punishment.
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that the time children spend in treatment facilities or detention
centers does, in fact, result in treatment and, moreover, does
not actually cause harm.184 However, it is fundamentally
inconsistent to treat children punitively when they are going
through the adjudication process and then provide treatment
and rehabilitation once they leave the courtroom. It makes
little sense to leave children physically and psychologically
bruised during their courtroom appearances and then deliver
them to an array of social services design to “rehabilitate”
them. If the juvenile justice system is premised on providing
treatment services for children, that treatment must begin
when children enter the courthouse.185 The justifications of
courtroom security and lack of prejudicial effect pale in
comparison to the compelling research regarding the deleterious effects of shackling on children. Moreover, the ABA
Standards, which provide that juvenile justice facilities should
further a sense of normalization as opposed to deviance,
further bolster the argument that shackling children in court
contravenes the goals of the juvenile justice system.
D.

Children and the Right to Treatment

Courts have recognized that once adjudicated as delinquent, juveniles have a constitutional “right to treatment,”
which includes the right to freedom from unreasonable bodily
restraint.186 However, the routine and indiscriminate use of

184
A thorough examination of conditions of confinement in youth facilities is
beyond the scope of this Note. See generally CUSTODY AND CONTROL, supra note 167
(discussing the conditions in two New York State institutions where female juvenile
delinquents are confined).
185
On the other hand, it can also be argued that indiscriminate shackling
violates a juvenile’s due process rights. Although the juvenile justice system is
supposed to be therapeutic, the Supreme Court provided juveniles with certain due
process rights to ensure that they were not taken advantage of by the system and still
had the opportunity for a fair trial. See supra Part III.B. The Supreme Court has
established that indiscriminate use of visible shackles violates a defendant’s right to a
fair trial and numerous juvenile courts have followed suit, applying the standard to the
juvenile court system. See supra Part II and infra Part V.
186
See Alexander S. v. Boyd, 876 F. Supp. 773, 797-98 (D.S.C. 1995) (citing
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)). The right to treatment developed in the
context of individuals who have been involuntarily committed for mental health
treatment, but courts apply this right with full force to delinquent juveniles. See
Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1177, 1179 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding that juveniles do
not have a constitutional right to “rehabilitative training” but relying on Youngberg to
find that juveniles do “have a due process interest in freedom from unnecessary bodily
restraint which entitles them to closer scrutiny of their conditions of confinement than
that accorded convicted criminals”); see also Jackson v. Johnson, 118 F. Supp 2d 278,
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shackles on children demonstrates that young people do not
enjoy a right to treatment during their court proceedings. The
legal right to treatment serves as another reason why the
practice of shackling children in court is fundamentally
inconsistent with the goals of the juvenile justice system.
Since juveniles, even when adjudicated as delinquents,
are not really convicted of crimes, once a young person is
adjudicated delinquent and sent to a facility, “restrictions on [a
juvenile’s] liberty . . . must be reasonably related to some
legitimate government objective—of rehabilitation, safety or
internal order and security.”187 This means that a juvenile may
not be placed in confinement or subjected to mechanical
restraints of any form without a determination that these
restrictions serve the rehabilitative needs of the child.
Moreover, even when a restriction of liberty is based on “safety
or internal order and security,” it cannot be an arbitrary or
indiscriminate practice.188 Rather, facility officials must
demonstrate that they have tried less restrictive means, and
have no alternative but to employ restraints.189
For example, Pena v. New York State Division for Youth,
the first New York case to address the issue of shackling
juveniles in treatment facilities, established the standard in
New York that unless absolutely necessary, shackling is
antithetical to the goals and objectives of the juvenile justice
system.190 In that case, the Southern District of New York
explicitly stated that the physical restraints were “highly antitherapeutic.”191 Moreover, the court recalled that when the

289 (N.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d in part, 13 Fed. Appx. 51 (2d Cir. 2001); B.H. v. Johnson, 715
F. Supp. 1387, 1394 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
187
Collazo, 714 F.2d at 1180.
188
Id.
189
See id. at 1181.
190
Pena v. N.Y. State Division for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203, 211 (S.D.N.Y.
1976). This case involved the use of shackles on children placed at Goshen, a
residential facility for boys adjudicated as delinquents. See id. at 204. The court held
that the New York State Division for Youth may not use shackles or restraints without
an individualized determination of danger. Id. at 211. This rule is codified in the new
York Code, which states “Physical restraints . . . shall be used only in cases where a
child is uncontrollable and constitutes a serious and evident danger to himself or
others.” 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 168.3(a).
191
Pena, 419 F. Supp. at 211. The court did not fully prohibit the use of
shackles, but made clear that shackles should only be used when necessary and that
there must always be an individualized determination of need. The court was
specifically referring to the facility practice of binding boys’ hands and feet with
handcuffs and plastic straps and then leaving them on the floor for hours at a time.
Moreover boys were also bound to furniture. While the use of restraints and shackles in
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United States Supreme Court decided to deprive juveniles of
the full panoply of procedural rights, they “made it clear that
the constitutional justification for this procedural deprivation
is the parens patriae underpinning of the juvenile justice
system and its absolute proscription against punishment and
retribution as permissible objectives.”192 Accordingly, juveniles
have a right to rehabilitative treatment that is violated when
the juvenile justice system employs methods that are antitherapeutic and punitive.193
Unfortunately, the legal analysis underpinning a child’s
right to treatment once she has been adjudicated delinquent
has not translated into a similar right during courtroom
proceedings. Clearly, the indiscriminate use of shackles on
children while they appear in court is anti-therapeutic. The
right to treatment should be enjoyed when children enter the
court system, and the same standard that prohibits arbitrary
use of restraints on children in treatment settings should
govern the use of shackles in court. Beyond this basic
inconsistency, when juveniles wait for hours in shackles for
their court appearances with no determination having been
made that the child is violent or dangerous, they may become
confused. Children may understand that their out-of-control
behavior in a facility has a consequence and may result in
the use of restraints. However, in court, if without acting
inappropriately they are still restrained, children will not
understand why they are being punished.
Thus, some courts have established that the use of
shackling violates the goals of the juvenile justice system, or at
the very least is intrusive of juveniles’ liberty, and should

confinement is beyond the scope of this Note, Pena is still illustrative of an early court
acknowledging that use of shackles can be “anti-therapeutic” and punitive. Id.
192
Pena, 419 F. Supp. at 206.
193
Id. (citing numerous cases for the proposition that juveniles have right to
rehabilitative treatment). See, e.g., Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166, 175 (E.D.
Tex. 1973); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Inmates of
Boys Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1364-65 (D.R.I. 1972); Nelson v.
Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451, 459 (N.D. Ind. 1972). The court reasoned that that the right
to treatment proscribes any detention of youth in a juvenile justice system that does
not provide for rehabilitative treatment. In concluding that the use of shackles and
restraints in the manner prescribed in this case was anti-therapeutic and punitive,
the court held that the practice violated the youths’ due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Pena, 419 F. Supp. at 207. This Note argues that similar to
detention, the repeated use of shackling juveniles during court proceedings is also antitherapeutic and violates children’s rights to rehabilitation and treatment- the primary
objective of the juvenile justice system.
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therefore not be imposed arbitrarily.194 Given this acknowledgment, combined with research demonstrating the harmful
effects of shackling on juveniles and the lack of sufficient
justifications to outweigh these harmful effects, the current
widespread practice of shackling children in court makes a
mockery of the goals of the juvenile justice system.
V.

TOWARD A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF SHACKLING JUVENILES
THAT REFLECTS THE PURPOSE OF THE JUVENILE
COURT SYSTEM

Shackling is a harmful practice that undermines the
goals of the juvenile justice system and causes serious harm to
children. This premise is not controversial among juvenile
justice scholars and practitioners, yet the practice persists.195
Evidence demonstrates that shackling juveniles causes both
physical and psychological damage and that children in the
juvenile justice system are particularly vulnerable.196 It is
axiomatic that children are developmentally different from
adults. Yet, juvenile courts often limit their analysis of
shackling to the framework used in non-juvenile proceedings.
That is, shackles are prejudicial when they are visible to juries,
and since there are no juries in juvenile court, there is no
prejudicial effect.197 However, courts should focus on the unique
impact shackling has on children and how it controverts the
purposes of the juvenile justice system.

194
Tiffany A. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363, 375 (Cal. App. 2007)
(holding that shackling without an individualized determination of need conflicts with
the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile court system); State v. Merrell, 12 P.3d 556, 558
(Or. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the use of shackles must be justified by a
determination that the defendant poses an immediate risk of danger or potential for
escape); In re Staley, 352 N.E.2d 3, 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (requiring the state to show a
“good reason” in order to justify use of shackles), aff’d, 364 N.E.2d 72.
195
See supra Part IV.A.
196
See supra Part IV.C.
197
See Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 626, 632 (2005) (holding visible
shackles are prejudicial to criminal defendants and thus are prohibited during the
capital sentencing phase as well as the guilt phase absent an essential state purpose).
As discussed in Part II, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court has cited two other primary
concerns regarding visible shackles: impairing communication between the defendant
and his attorney, and degrading the dignity and decorum of the courtroom. While the
few juvenile courts that have addressed the issue of visible shackles have acknowledged these other two arguments, the absence of jury prejudice has led some judges to
conclude that any error was harmless. See, e.g., State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of
Multonomah County v. Millican, 906 P.2d 857, 860-61 (Or. App. 1995); State v. E.J.Y.,
55 P.3d 673, 679 (Wash. App. 2002).
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The Legal Standard for Juveniles

Most of the case law on the use of shackles in courts
involves the adult criminal justice system as opposed to the
juvenile court system.198 Some states, however, have addressed
the routine use of shackles on youth in juvenile court
proceedings.199 The states that have addressed the issue of
shackles in juvenile court proceedings primarily echo the
general principle that has been applied in the adult court
system: shackles should not be required unless there is an
individualized determination of need.200 The opinions indicate
that while juvenile court proceedings may not have the same
concern regarding the prejudicial effect of shackles in front of a
jury, other concerns emphasized in Deck are still relevant.201
These courts relied on the same reasoning as the United States
Supreme Court in Deck—that shackles affect the ability to be
present and participate in one’s defense, are an affront to
human dignity and to the dignity of the courtroom, and impair
one’s ability to communicate with counsel.202 However, in
198
See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 32, at 17 (discussing several state cases
recognizing as a general rule an accused’s right to appear at trial free of shackles).
199
California, Oregon, Illinois, Washing, North Dakota, and Florida have case
law on the issue of shackling juveniles during juvenile court proceedings. See, e.g.,
Tiffany A. v. Superior Court of L.A. County, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363 (Ct. App. 2007); S.Y.
v. McMillan, 563 So. 2d 807 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); In re Staley, 352 N.E.2d 3 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1976), aff’d, 364 N.E.2d 72 (1977); In re R.W.S., 728 N.W.2d 326 (N.D. 2007);
State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Multnomah County v. Millican, 906 P.2d 857 (Or. Ct.
App. 1995); State v. E.J.Y., 55 P.3d 673 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). There is more case law
on the use of physical restraints during confinement either in a juvenile detention
facility or residential treatment center. See, e.g., Pena, 419 F. Supp. at 207; Martarella,
349 F. Supp. at 583.
200
Courts vary on what factors should be considered for determining need. See
Tiffany A. v. Superior Court of L.A., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363, 373 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); In
re Deshaun M., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 627, 630 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that a lesser
showing of need is required for shackling a juvenile during a jurisdictional hearing in a
juvenile delinquency proceeding compared to a jury trial). In Tiffany A., the court found
that two main principles from Deshaun M. should be considered when determining if
shackling juveniles is necessary: (1) the type of proceeding determines the showing
required to justify shackling (e.g., a jury trial requires a greater showing than a bench
trial) and (2) the reason for the need of shackling must be a record of violence or a
threat of violence by the accused. Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 372. The court
expressly stated that lack of courtroom personnel is not a sufficient reason for a
showing of need. Id. at 373. But see In re R.W.S., 728 N.W.2d 326, 331 (N.D. 2007)
(finding that the security situation of the courtroom and courthouse is one of the
factors to consider).
201
See, e.g., Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 366; Staley, 352 N.E.2d. at 5;
Millican, 906 P.2d at 860.
202
Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 624 (2005); Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr.3d at
366; Deshaun M., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 629-30; Staley, 352 N.E.2d at 5-6; R.W.S., 728
N.W.2d at 330; Millican, 906 P.2d at 860.
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addition, many courts then assert that since juveniles do not
have a right to a jury trial, there is no possibility for jury
prejudice. Thus, the analysis results in the conclusion that that
failure to make an individualized determination of need is
harmless error.203
Although there may be a diminished concern for prejudice in juvenile court, there are other concerns, primarily
the conflict with the goals of the juvenile justice system. The
absence of a strong concern for jury prejudice should not leave
the door open for courts to justify shackling children when it
is well-documented that the practice is physically and psychologically damaging to children.
The opinion in Tiffany A. v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles County is a model for a legal analysis of shackling
juveniles that reflects both the distinct needs of children and
the objectives of the juvenile justice system.204 In that case, the
California Superior Court held that shackling without an
individualized determination of need was unlawful not only
because it violated the principles from Deck, but also because
the use of shackles was contrary to the principles of the
juvenile justice system.205 The court noted that “[t]he objectives
of the juvenile justice system differ from those of the adult . . .
system, and thus justify a less punitive approach to those who
stand accused . . . before the court.”206 Therefore, while some
courts have concluded that adult defendants do not have the
right to appear unshackled when there is no jury present,
Tiffany A. stands for the proposition that there are other
considerations besides the prejudicial effect of shackles that
demand restricting its use.207 Indeed the court emphatically
stated:
203
204

See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
See Tiffany A. v. Superior Court of L.A. County, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363 (Ct.

App. 2007).
205

Id. at 374-75.
Id. The court distinguished Howard on a number of different grounds.
First they noted that an individualized security assessment may not have been possible
for each defendant prior to his or her initial appearance, second Howard only concerns
first appearances where as the instant case concerned the use of shackles at each
appearance, and third Howard involved proceedings with multiple defendants. Id. at
374.
207
The Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have both held that
visible shackles worn in front of a magistrate judge, who will not make the ultimate
determination of the defendant’s guilt, do not offend the principles from Deck. See
United States v. Howard, 480 F.3d 1005, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Zuber, 118 F.3d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 1997). The court in Tiffany A. distinguished Howard,
in which the Ninth Circuit held that a district-wide policy to shackle all adult in206
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[T]he rationale of the California cases—that the Constitution does
not require juveniles to have the full complement of rights afforded
adult defendants because to do so would introduce a tone of
criminality into juvenile proceedings—would not be served by
requiring all juveniles, irrespective of the charges against them, or
their conduct in custody, to wear shackles during all court
proceedings.208

Similarly, in Juvenile Department of Multnomah County
v. Millican, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the
adult standards for shackling must apply to juveniles.209
However, they held that the error in this case was harmless
because there was no evidence of prejudice or indication that
the shackles “adversely affected the child’s decision to testify,”
noting that he did so “without any suggestion of discomfort or
reluctance.”210 In dissent, Judge De Muniz argued that the error
was not harmless. He focused his argument on the distinct
characteristics of juveniles. In addition to the factors from
State v. Kessler,211 the prevailing case in Oregon on standards
for applying shackles on adult criminal defendants, he
suggested the court should consider the “potentially prejudicial
effect on a child’s ability to testify, because shackling is likely
to be more psychologically jarring for children than adults.”212
Dissenting Judge De Muniz properly noted that
shackles may “undermine a child’s confidence in telling his side
of the story, which would adversely affect the credibility
determination of even the most experienced juvenile judge.”213
Moreover, he asserted that shackling children without a record
of individualized need “not only violates the protections
afforded adults, it also thwarts the historical purpose of
Oregon’s juvenile justice system.”214 This type of analysis
recasts the issue into one about the distinct nature of juveniles
and recalls the premise of the juvenile justice system. In order
for the insidious practice of shackling juveniles to end, courts
must see beyond the rule set forth in Deck and challenge the

custody defendants for their first appearances before the federal magistrate did not
violate constitutional rights. Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 374-75.
208
Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr.3d at 375.
209
State ex rel. Juvenile Dept. of Multnomah County v. Millican, 906 P.2d
857, 860 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
210
Id. at 861.
211
645 P.2d 1070 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
212
Millican, 906 P.2d at 861.
213
Id. at 861.
214
Id. at 862.
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practice on the grounds that it violates the principles of the
juvenile justice system.
B.

The Court as a “Locus for Education”

If the obvious harms that result from shackling children
are not enough, there is another reason to end this insidious
practice. Time spent within the juvenile court system should be
an opportunity for children to learn powerful lessons about
fairness, equality, and justice—three pillars of our democracy.
Historically, the court was seen as a place for ongoing
education of the child.215 As one scholar remarked, the juvenile
court was “a locus for education and an instrument of social
instruction in the path to citizenship . . . . The school and court
are bound in an intricate public mission: to teach, to care for, to
sanction the young.”216 Children are in an ongoing process of
learning, and much of what they learn is by example.217
Furthermore, research suggests that when children believe a
law is legitimate they are more likely to comply with it.218
Courtroom policies that require the routine use of shackles on
juveniles are arbitrary and reinforce in children the notion that
our justice system is unfair and inequitable.
Shackles are a mark of guilt and are utterly dehumanizing. Indeed, shackles conjure the image of a caged animal. If
we want to teach children and youth to respect people, to make
215
Bernardine Dohrn, The School, the Child, and the Court, in A CENTURY OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE 267, 267-69 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002). Dohrn notes
that the school and the court were historically intertwined. Id. at 267. The first
juvenile court coincided with social movements around public education for children.
Id. Although not directly relevant to the arguments in this Note, the U.S. Supreme
Court’s analysis of children’s free speech rights in school in the landmark case Tinker
v. Des Moines School District serves as an analogy for understanding the argument
against blanket shackling policies. In Tinker, the Court held that children had freespeech rights in school that were not necessarily subsidiary to the authority of school
officials. 393, U.S. 503, 508 (1968). The Court emphatically stated that the mere
“undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the
right to freedom of expression.” Id. Similarly, “mere undifferentiated fear” should not
be sufficient to justify the wholesale shackling of children in the juvenile court system.
216
Id. at 268-69. A detailed discussion of the interplay between the school and
the court is beyond the scope of this Note. However, the author points out that the
pedagogical stance of the early juvenile court often preached racial superiority and a
rigid formulation of appropriate behavior and cultural norms. Id. at 304. This Note
draws on the analogy between schools and courts only to argue that courts can be seen
as an outlet for teaching democratic ideals. And, to the extent that the court may serve
this purpose, shackling stands in contrast to such values.
217
See ZIMRING, supra note 82, at 17.
218
Jeffrey Fagan & Tom R. Tyler, Legal Socialization of Children and
Adolescents, SOCIAL JUSTICE RESEARCH, Sept. 2005, at 217, 236.
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independent choices instead of succumbing to peer-pressure,
and to think cautiously and astutely before they act, then the
court system should serve as a model for such values.219
Instead, by routinely shackling young people, without exercising any individual judgment, the court sends a contradictory
message to children and youth—one that suggests that
independent judgment is not in fact valued. Further, shackling
is a violent practice and gives the message that the court will
treat suspected violence with violence. This eye-for-an-eye type
of message does little to educate young people about respect
and trust. Moreover, it certainly does not leave children with
any reason to have faith in the system that is judging them.
Just as children’s rights do not stop at the school house door,
rights for young people do not stop at the courtroom door.220
Ending the practice of shackling does not have to result
in sacrificing important values, such as promoting safe courts
and communities, and ensuring young people are made aware
of the consequences of their actions. As former New York
Supreme Court Judge Michael Corriero221 has noted, “Focusing
on the best interests of the child . . . does not mean circumventing the best interests of society. The two interests are, for
the most part, coextensive. What’s good for the child in a
democratic society is good for society as a whole.”222 Society
benefits when we treat children fairly by limiting the use of
dehumanizing shackles to only those individuals that otherwise
absolutely cannot be controlled. All of the children who enter
the juvenile justice system will eventually return to society.
Society will benefit from children who come back to their
communities without the scars of shackling. The imprint left on
the mind when a young person who is required to appear in
court in shackles, in front of family and community members,
may leave us with a child who is forever scarred. It is time to
remove the chains and return to the rehabilitative goals of the

219
See ZIMRING, supra note 82, at 17-22 (arguing that modern adolescence is
akin to a “learner’s permit” whereby children are constantly learning behaviors and
much of what they learn is from following examples).
220
See Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503-05 (1969). Rights for
juveniles do not stop at the courthouse door, except for those rights that are
inconsistent with the status of being a juvenile. See supra Part III.B.
221
Judge Corriero was the presiding judge of the Manhattan Criminal Court
Youth Part from 1992 to 2006. CORRIERO, supra note 108, at vii. He heard cases
involving 13, 14 and 15 year olds who were being tried as adults pursuant to New
York’s Juvenile Offender Law. Id. at 7.
222
Id. at 6.
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juvenile justice system. Then, perhaps, the courtroom may
return as a “locus for education.”223
CONCLUSION
Shackling is a physically and psychologically damaging
practice that contravenes the ultimate goal of the juvenile
justice system: to rehabilitate children. Criminal defendants in
the adult system enjoy the right to appear in court free from
visible shackles.224 Many juveniles, however, still suffer under
blanket policies requiring the routine use of shackles without
an individualized determination of need.225 When juvenile
courts require children to appear in court shackled, the
message young people learn is that they are violent, dangerous
criminals. This practice is inconsistent with juveniles’ right to
treatment and has the effect of actually harming children.
Jenny P. and the thousands of other children who go through
the juvenile justice system in America are in that system
because our society believes they should be given an opportunity to learn from their mistakes, change their behaviors,
and receive services to assist them in realizing their full
potential. Juvenile courts should end the routine practice of
shackling so they may pursue the goal of rehabilitating
children.
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